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LAW'S PATRIARCHY

LYNNE HENDERSON
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[T]he principle which regulates existing social relations between the two sexes-the legal subordination of one sex to
the other-is wrong in itself, and now one of the chief hindrances to human improvement... it ought to be replaced
by a principle of perfect equality, admitting no power or
privilege on the one side, nor disability on the other.
-- John Stuart Mill (1986:1)
1. FEMINISTS AND LAW
As John Stuart Mill observed at the beginning of The Subjection of Women (1986), law and legal institutions in a number of
cultures (if not all) have played a significant role in maintaining
systems that subordinate and oppress female human beings, and
law continues to do so. The change from status to contract celebrated by Sir Henry Maine left women unaffected for the most
part-women who married, which was most women, could not
enter contracts and lost their property rights (Kay 1988:191-92;
Chused 1983; Backhouse 1988). Law further maintained women's
inferior status through its privileging of the rights of husbands and
through the laws of inheritance. Democratic revolutions in the
United States and France left women disenfranchised, legally and
constitutionally excluded from full membership in these "democI want to thank Paul Brest, Mary Becker, Lawrence Friedman, Robert

Gordon, Lauren Robel, Morrison Torrey, Robert Weisberg, and Robin West
for their helpful comments on drafts of this essay, and to the Chicago Feminist

law teachers and friends for their help with the final draft. The essay is dedicated to the memory of my mother, who introduced me to feminism.
LAW & SOCIETY REVIEW, Volume 25, Number 2 (1991)

412

LAW'S PATRIARCHY

racies." Law has defined and regulated women's sexuality through
the law of marriage and paternal rights and through the criminalization of fornication, adultery, abortion, and prostitution. For
those seeking to end the subordination of women, then, law has
been one of the sites of the struggle against that subordination.
Law, however, is not something "out there," unrelated to politics, culture, or power. Thus, feminists concerned about law often
frame the issues in terms of law's relation to "patriarchy."
Although "patrarchy" technically refers to families ruled by a senior male "patriarch," it more generally refers to the systematic
domination and subordination of females by males. While the term
runs the risk of reification-blame it on "The Patriarchy"-I do
not know of a better term to capture men's cultural, economic,
political, and physical domination and devaluation of women.
Under patriarchy, men are the model and the embodiment of the
fully human; to maintain their status and power, men are entitled
to exercise both subtle and violent control over women. Patriarchy
is both belief and practice, thought and action. To borrow from
Catharine MacKinnon's discussion of dominance under patriarchy
(p. 138), the power to define "who does what to whom and gets
away with it" belongs to men. As Carol Smart argues (see, e.g., pp.
13, 35), under patriarchy, men define the real and what counts as
knowledge.
Carol Smart, Catharine MacKinnon, and Zillah Eisenstein all
agree that men have shaped and controlled law as an institution,
as a practice, and as a source of meaning in the modern state.
Therefore, they each assert, law contains, produces, and reproduces patriarchy. I agree that "masculine" thought and patriarchal
assumptions have determined much of the content and shape of
law, legal thinking, and judicial and legislative attitudes. For this
reason, women who seek to end patriarchy must focus on dismantling its legal form and eradicating its social, political, and economic manifestations both with and without law's help.
Historically in the United States, for example, feminists have
attempted to use law as a tool for gaining equality for women. Abigail Adams wrote her husband John, then a member of the Continental Congress, urging him not to "forget the ladies" in building a
new nation under the rule of law (Norton 1988); the Seneca Falls
conference ended with a declaration calling for equal legal rights
for women. Feminists urged that sex as well as race be included in
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
campaigned tirelessly for the right to vote. The desire for equal
rights did not end when the constitution was amended to allow
women to vote; indeed, shortly after the passage of the Nineteenth
Amendment, feminists pushed for an equal rights amendment as
well. Some version of an equal rights amendment to the Constitution has been introduced in Congress almost yearly since the
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1920s.1 Concern for equal rights and suffrage was hardly confined
to the United States. John Stuart Mill published The Subjection of
Women in England in 1869, arguing that women should have equal
2
legal, social, and economic rights together with the right to vote;
women in other Western countries have fought for voting rights
and legal reforms (Becker 1990).
In the United States, after a period of relative quiescence,
feminist efforts in the 1960s and 1970s produced a number of statutory and judicial reforms as well as administrative regulations to
combat sex discrimination and to assist women. Feminist lawyers
employed arguments from liberalism's principle of equality and
from analogies to race to push for constitutionally recognized
equality for women. And after years of finding differential treatment of women constitutionally permissible, the Supreme Court in
the early 1970s found that the equal protection clause did prohibit
many forms of discrimination on the basis of sex.3 MacKinnon's
formulation of sexual harassment as a cause of action as sex discrimination that violated title VII of the Civil Rights Act not only
gave a name to this habitual practice (Goodman 1989) but also legitimated women's claims that the practice humiliated, degraded,
intimidated, and injured them. The EEOC promulgated guidelines
on sexual harassment, and the courts have, increasingly, accepted
sexual harassment as a legitimate cause of action. Finally, the
Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade (1973), for all its flaws,
made an enormous difference in the material well-being of women's lives.
Feminists not only concentrated on courts; they sought legislative changes as well. Rape reform laws passed in a number of
states; some legislatures even went so far as to abolish the "marital
rape" exemption, at least from the law-on-the-books. Legislatures
also changed state laws governing "domestic" violence. The law of
divorce became "no-fault," enabling countless women to exit oppressive marriages. And title VII's prohibition on sex discrimination in the workplace also was an important legislative contribution. While it was southerners, not feminists, who added "sex" to
the proposed law that became title VII in order to defeat its passage,4 leading Catharine MacKinnon to quip that "the law of sex
1 I say "almost yearly" because after Congress passed the ERA in 1972,
there was a hiatus while the states considered adoption-until the amendment
failed to receive ratification within the original seven-year time period.
2 Mill wrote the essay in 1861 (Edwards 1967:322).
3 The Court indicated classifications by sex would receive scrutiny under
the equal protection clause in Reed v. Reed (1971), but a clearer indication that
sex classifications would receive some special scrutiny emerged in 1973 in the
case of Frontiero v. Richardson (1973). The exact nature of that scrutiny did
not become clear until 1976, when the Court decided Craig v. Boren (1976).
4 There is virtually no legislative history about why Congress retained
the prohibition against sex discrimination, with an exception for "bona fide occupational qualification," in Title VII's prohibition on employment discrimination against individuals.
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equality" is "statutory by joke" (p. 215), title VII became the basis
for opening up a number of employment opportunities for women.
Further, women began to enter the legal profession in significant
numbers, giving some hope that laws grounded in stereotypes and
indifferent to the situation of women would soon fall as women
gained influence and power in the profession. As the 1970s drew to
a close, progress for women through law in the United States and
elsewhere seemed possible and real to many feminists.
There were, of course, troubling countertrends to the seemingly abundant achievements of women in the law, but no one
seemed discouraged. The Supreme Court's decisions in Gilbert
(1976) and Geduldig (1974), cases involving exclusion of pregnancy
from disability insurance coverage that will be forever famous for
the legal distinction between "pregnant women and non-pregnant
persons" (Geduldig v. Aiello 1974:497 n.20), were a setback, but the
federal Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 presumably reversed
the Court's "mistake." The Court declined to make sex, like race, a
"suspect class"; women, after all, were "different," and those differences had to be recognized. The tenacity of the belief in "difference" made all but the most archaic gender-specific legislation a
battleground where women in the United States usually lost, as
MacKinnon and Eisenstein both observe. The irony of equality and
difference created a number of catch-22 decisions: Statutory rape
laws punishing males but not females, enacted to protect the chastity and control the sexuality of girls and young women, not to
protect them from abuse or exploitation, are now justified because
females get pregnant and males don't (Michael M. v. Superior
Court 1981). Congress can reasonably require only men to register
for the draft, because women aren't allowed in combat (Rotsker v.
Goldberg 1981). States may prefer military service veterans in hiring workers without discriminating against women, because giving
credit for military service has nothing to do with the military's historic discrimination against women in the armed services (Personnel Administrator v. Feeney 1979). Women can be denied guard
jobs in prisons because the inmates will rape them, because they
are women (Dothard v. Rawlinson 1977). And Congress has repeatedly denied Medicaid funding for abortions for poor women,
with the Court's approval (see, e.g., Harrisv. McCrae 1980).
Even given the push for equality generally in the United
States, feminists had difficulty obtaining full justice for women, in
terms of either formal or substantive equality. The liberal legal
feminist strategy of gender blindness not only promoted equal
treatment of men and women, but also rendered any legislation
designed to make up for widespread effects of discrimination
against, or subordination of, women vulnerable to challenge by
men as "special treatment." For example, pregnancy leave arguably was "special treatment"; although the Supreme Court upheld a
state pregnancy disability leave law, the Court has also emphasized
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that states need not make any allowances for pregnancy. 5 Affirmative action, as African Americans know all too well, means "less
qualified"; much of the media characterization of the Court's decision in Johnson v. TransportationAgency (1987), upholding a challenge to an employer's affirmative action program, was that the
Court upheld the promotion of a "less qualified" woman over a
man, overlooking the fact that their qualifications were actually
quite similar.
By the 1980s, as Zillah Eisenstein's book documents, the political climate in the United States changed. According to Eisenstein,
the "Reagan revolution" and its "rearticulation of the patriarchal
state" (p. 125) endangered feminist, accomplishments. The moral
Right and neoconservative control of the government and judiciary
sought to put women back in their place-the home, serving a
man-through law (pp. 120-32, 152-90). Feminist achievements toward equality under the law were and are deeply threatened,
Eisenstein argues. Smart and MacKinnon assert, however, that the
law hadn't improved the situation of women all that much before
neoconservatives and the Right gained political control; law's patriarchy had made most accomplishments ephemeral at best. Rape
reform laws in the United States helped some, but the women victims were still often tried instead of the defendants-and were
found wanting. And it appears from Smart's discussion that feminists never achieved any meaningful rape reform in the United
Kingdom. Additionally, in both countries, women of color weren't
believed or taken seriously when they said they were raped. In the
United States, studies indicated that divorce reform disadvantaged
women both financially and in terms of custody of their children
(see, e.g., Weitzman 1986; Fineman 1988). Equal rights became
men's/father's rights. Abortion rights were under constant attack
in state legislatures, and, as I have already mentioned, were often
not a reality for poor women. Fetal rights not only became a rallying cry for anti-abortionists but also became a way of keeping women out of more lucrative traditionally "male" jobs, as Eisenstein
notes (pp. 208-9). These developments stalled feminist legal efforts, indicating that legal change would not be instant, easy, or
even possible. The loss of ground and progress also demonstrated
how, as Smart argues in her book, the discourse of law could always be turned against women. Indeed, the stalling of feminist
progress toward political and legal change, combined with the
backlash of the 1980s and splits within the feminist community,
have led some to speak of a "postfeminist" era.
"At present," Smart writes, "it seems as if feminist 'legal theory' is immobilized in the face of the failure of feminism to affect
5 Compare California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra (1987)
(upholding California mandatory leave law) with Wimberly v. Labor & Industrial Rel Com'n (1987) (upholding refusal to grant unemployment benefits to
woman whose job was unavailable after employer-granted maternity leave).

416

LAW'S PATRIARCHY

law and the failure of law to transform the quality of women's
lives" (p. 5). This hardly seems true given the energy of these
three books and the number of productive and imaginative feminist legal writers in this country and elsewhere. 6 But it is true that
feminism has been in a kind of crisis recently, and to this extent,
feminist legal theory is as well. Indeed, Smart, MacKinnon, and
Eisenstein's books all reflect the crisis and tensions running
through the feminist community. Accordingly, a (very) brief review of the tensions in feminism today may provide a background
against which to examine the works being discussed here.
Feminism has been challenged not only by reactionary forces
but within feminist circles. Debates and fights have broken out
over the "difference/sameness" problem, "cultural" versus "liberal" feminism versus "radical" feminism, and the issues of "essentialism," "contextualism," "foundationalism," and "materialism,"
as well as over particular issues facing women such as pornography and pregnancy leave. Women of color and lesbian women have
criticized the assumptions of the "dominant" strand of feminismas if any form of feminism were ever dominant-for devaluing and
failing to come to terms with feminism's exclusion of their experiences (Crenshaw 1989). And it is true, both historically and now,
that many feminists, including me, have been blind to their own
racism, heterosexism, and/or narrow assumptions about the effects
of class on women's lives. In "legal theory," the most divisive issues have echoed these same themes: As Smart notes, the most visible splits occurred in the heated and hurtful debate over the
MacKinnon-Dworkin pornography ordinance, in which charges
and countercharges caused feminists personal pain and political
damage.
Although feminism and feminist theory need correction and
criticism when they fail to recognize the experiences of women
and the differences among us, if we fight among ourselves in a
damaging way, hurling epithets at each other, patriarchy wins. We
run the risk of being distracted from our task of uncovering, opposing, and eliminating patriarchy's power in its many guises,
including its legal guise. "Many feminisms ''7 can mean a house divided, the oppressed attacking the oppressed, or careful consideration of situated women, and a rich, full, particularistic description
of, and commitment to, bettering the lot of women. Differences
over theory and concepts exist, but when differences are strategic,
they should not be seen as betrayals of feminism. For example,
Mill has been relegated to the argument for liberal feminism and
criticized for his assumption that only "exceptional women" would
6 My own failure to keep up with the literature is an example of how
much productivity there is; I am loath to "name names," as I would hate to
omit contributions because of my own scholarly sloth.
7 I am grateful to Bob Gordon for this phrase. It also appears in Bender
1988:5.
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seek full equality, but the opening quote identifies three issues of
continuing concern to feminists in law: the problems of power, the
problems of inequality, and the problems of privilege and disability. These multiple sites of oppression call for mutiple approaches
and theories.
We cannot afford to lose sight of how much we do agree: Women should not be abused, oppressed, or dominated; women
should have full human status and a role in defining what that is;
women's voices and language should be heard and attended to. We
need to draw on history and experience to guide us in this project
as well. And it seems to me that Catharine MacKinnon, Carol
Smart, and Zillah Eisenstein's books all contain important contributions to the feminist project, although they represent differing
strands of feminist thought applied to law. MacKinnon could be
characterized as dealing with the problem of power, Eisenstein
with the problem of equality, and Smart with the problem of privilege and disadvantage. Each author says something that seems
true, powerful, and useful for understanding where feminism's
legal project should go from here; not surprisingly, none can be
said to have the answer for solving the problem of law's patriarchy.
The books cover many of the same "legal" issues confronting
women, including the meaning of "equality," the regulation of
abortion and pregnancy, and pornography.8 Each author gives
passing recognition to the effects of class and race but concentrates
on women's commonalities and not their differences across race
and class. Lesbian women are largely absent from the books; only
Smart's text consistently distinguishes "sex" and "(hetero)sexuality." Eisenstein's book concentrates on the political economy
of women's situation; Smart's book ranges over a number of issues;
MacKinnon's book concentrates primarily on violence toward women. Perhaps as a result of their understandings of law and gender as well as of their specific academic backgrounds, the authors
draw different conclusions about law's relation to feminism. Lawyer-political theorist MacKinnon considers the state and law to be
almost synonymous and therefore a major site for feminist struggle and radical change; political scientist Eisenstein sees law as an
instrument in reformist political, economic, and social change for
women; and sociologist Smart sees law as a patriarchal institution
almost impervious to meaningful change by feminists.
MacKinnon, Smart, and Eisenstein all argue that law is deeply
gendered, although they differ on what that means. For MacKinnon, patriarchy's engendering of law is rooted in power, specifically male sexual power. Women are unequal because they are
8 Because of the "revolution" in the United States Supreme Court during
the 1989 term, there have been several changes in the politics and law of abortion and equality since these books went to press; the reader should be advised
that some of the paricular discussions of Supreme Court doctrine in the
books are dated.
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subordinated and dominated by male power. For Eisenstein, the
engendering of law is based on the law's discursive privileging of
the "phallus," which necessarily creates inequality. For Smart, law
is a discipline in which patriarchal power/knowledge defines the
legal world. For MacKinnon, "law" and "the state" are inseparable; the state legitimates and incorporates male dominance and the
male point of view "in and as law" (p. 238). For Eisenstein, law appears to be a subset of politics; law is "an authorized language of
the state" (p. 20), an authoritative "discourse." This authoritative
discourse can be used in the liberal legal state to create or subvert
full equality for women. For Smart, law is a "claim to power" that
"embodies a claim to a superior and unified field of knowledge"
and the ability "to impose its definition of events on everyday life"
(p. 4). She appears to treat law as a separate, semiautonomous, if
not autonomous, discipline.
For all three authors, "woman" is a social construct; "man" is
also a social construct, but man's construction is largely treated as
immutable and unchangeable. That is, each author appears to assume that men can't or won't battle the social construct of masculinity, because they are advantaged by it and have no incentive to
change things. Each author also abandons the "traditional" feminist distinction between "sex" and "gender," recognizing that to
some extent the biology of sex is determined by the culture of gender and vice versa. MacKinnon's rejection of the distinction is the
most consistent; she uses the words interchangeably, because
under her theory gender defines sex and sex defines gender.
Eisenstein and Smart, who both rely on postmodern social theory
to an extent, also reject "essentialist" notions of "sex," arguing
that there is no unmediated and irreducible biological foundation
or "essence" to human sexuality. Yet at other times both authors
treat sex and gender as separate. Eisenstein, for example, acknowledges that sex and gender determine each other, but argues toward the end of her book that they should be separated as much as
possible; Smart appears to rely on a notion of unmediated human
sexuality in her critique of using law to regulate pornography.
Each author has a different view of patriarchy's law and what,
if anything, feminism can do to change it. Eisenstein, the "liberal"
feminist representative, wants to concentrate on women's sameness to men and to use liberalism's commitment to individual
human dignity to provide meaningful equality for women. MacKinnon and Smart are "radical" feminists who draw very different
conclusions. MacKinnon argues that women are oppressed by and
through law; women should use law's power to dismantle their
subordination. "A feminist jurisprudence . . . is accountable to

women's concrete conditions and to changing them" (p. 249). She
appears to be confident that law can be used radically to change
the status of women. Smart disagrees that radical change is possible, calling instead for feminists to abandon law reform efforts and
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to stand outside law: Feminists should "challenge such an important signifier of masculine power" through continuing critique and
"deconstruction" (see, e.g., pp. 2, 165) and resist the "siren call" of
law reform. These conclusions rest on the major premises and arguments of the authors, each of which I wish to summarize and
critique before drawing my own conclusions about the directions in
which we should go.
II. CATHARINE MACKINNON: THE PROBLEM OF POWER
Because Catharine MacKinnon has been one of the most influential feminist legal thinkers over the past decade and a half, I
shall begin with Toward a Feminist Theory of the State. No one
working in the field today can deny the debt to her thought and
contribution. Even if feminism has no "canon" in the traditional
sense, having avoided "(the) grand theory and (the) great theorist"
and having "no Derridas, Lacans, Foucaults, or Bartheses" (Gagnier 1990:21, 26), MacKinnon's work certainly approaches that status. Indeed, her influence is apparent in both Smart's and Eisenstein's books, as each both rely on her work in some areas and
criticize it in others.
Toward a Feminist Theory of the State contains nothing new
for those familiar with MacKinnon's writings; indeed, she notes
that it is a synthesis of her thought up to the present (p. xiv).
Thus, for those already familiar with her writings, the book may
seem redundant. On the other hand, because all her arguments
have been brought together in one volume and have been tied together in an organized form, the book is an excellent resource.
Further, the book elaborates and explains her work. The book, unlike its predecessor, Feminism Unmodified (1987), is "theoretical"
MacKinnon rather than MacKinnon as speaker/advocate. The difference in structure and emphasis means the book sometimes
yields up such sentences as "Gender, in other words, is lived as ontology, not as epistemology" (p. 237). At the same time, much of
the book contains MacKinnon's voice in all its rhetorical power
and brilliance; her mastery of metaphor and use of aphorism is, at
times, stunning. As an example, her cogent critique of the usefulness of postmodern discourse theories argues that "reality" is not
just a "discursive practice" or an illusory objectivity: "Epistemologically speaking, women know the male world is out there because
it hits them in the face.... It has all the indeterminacy of a bridge
abutment hit at sixty miles an hour" (p. 123).
Although it is divided into three sections, the book basically
contains two major divisions. In the first section, entitled "Feminism and Marxism," MacKinnon effectively examines and critiques the application of Marxist and Millian-liberal political philosophy to feminism. She also criticizes the arguments of a number of
feminist political theorists for their reliance on male political phi-
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losophers and failure to take sufficient account of the issue of male
power. The remainder of the book sets out her vision of feminism
and arguments about the source of women's oppression, and that is
the argument I summarize here. It is not a gentle argument or an
easy one to accept on a first or even second reading; readers, particularly those unfamiliar with MacKinnon's work, may find their
own beliefs, attitudes, and assumptions about sex and sexuality
threatened and shaken. What she has to say is illuminating, useful,
and worth struggling with, however.
Feminism, "radical feminism," or "feminism unmodified" is
the only true feminism for MacKinnon; other feminisms are dependent on and determined by masculine visions of politics and reality (p. 117). To uncover true feminism, unmediated by men, requires the use of consciousness raising, listening to women's voices,
thoughts, experience, and pain. What you will hear from these
voices, according to MacKinnon, is the story of male abuse of females: forced heterosexuality, sexual harassment, rape, child sexual abuse, and battery. If you listen, you will learn that women are
objects to men, not human subjects; they are objects of abusive and
dominating male power. And that male power is sexual power.
Thus, gender oppression through male sexual dominance should
be the concern of feminism; "all women live in sexual objectification the way fish live in water" (p. 149) in every culture and regardless of their sexual orientation. In every race and class, women are reduced to sexual objects; race and class are subsets of
male domination and female subordination. The structure of life,
law, and the state under patriarchy is that of authoritarian, almost
totalitarian, domination of women by men. Men are the authoritarian rulers, using every form of power to keep women subordinated and oppressed; always in the background of other forms
of power such as law and government is coercion by sheer physical
force and violence. Although not all men use physical force against
women, men "as a group benefit from these same arrangements by
which women are deprived" (p. 93). The threat of physical force
works to intimidate women, preventing them from asserting their
power "not because men are stronger, but because they are willing
and able to use their strength with relative social impunity; or not
because they use it, but because they do not have to" (ibid.). Finally, "it is not only that men treat women badly, although they
often do, but that it is their choice whether or not to do so" (p. 94).
MacKinnon's explanation for why men choose to treat women so
badly is based on her theory of sexuality.
MacKinnon has relentlessly and courageously pursued the
theory that the definition and construction of sex/gender is based
in sexuality, specifically, aggressive, acquisitive, violent male sexuality. Sex is knowledge and belief, not biology, "ontology," or "Being." "Woman" is the social construct of "man's sexual desire":
"Socially,, femaleness means femininity, which means attractive-
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ness to men, which means sexual attractiveness, which means sexual availability on male terms" (p. 110). Male sexuality therefore
defines and determines sex inequality. It does so because it is predatory, violent, dehumanizing, and controlling. According to MacKinnon, there is nothing essentially "biological" about sex-at least
nothing essentially biological about women-that causes this dominating male sexuality. In criticizing Brownmiller's thesis that it is
men's physiological structure that makes them "'natural predators'" and rapists, for example, MacKinnon remarks that
Brownmiller's biological argument fails because "[s]he does not
seem to think it necessary to explain why women do not lurk in
bushes and forcibly engulf men, an equal biological possibility" (p.
56). And in an ironic aside following excerpts from a female sadist's description of the pleasures of power and domination, MacKinnon notes, "The good news is, it is not biological" (p. 142). "It is
one thing to identify women's biology as part of the terrain on
which a struggle for dominance is acted out; it is another to identify women's biology as the source of that subordination" (p. 54).
To be a woman is to occupy a status rather than a "class."
Woman's status is sex object; "'woman' is defined by what male
desire requires for arousal and satisfaction" (p. 131). What males
require for arousal and satisfaction is dominance and violence:
MacKinnon bases her claim not only on the empirical and narrative evidence of widespread sexual abuse of girls and women, but
also on the analysis of pornography she and Andrea Dworkin have
done. Indeed, it is her insistence on the reduction of patriarchy to
sexual violence and sexual violence to pornography that drives
much of her argument. We know that men want dominance and
violence because of pornography:
It shows how men see the world .... It shows what men
want and gives it to them. From the testimony of pornography, what men want is: women bound, women battered,
women tortured, women humiliated, women degraded and
defiled, women killed. Or, to be fair to the soft core,
women sexually accessible, have-able, there for them,
wanting to be taken and used. (P. 138)
Pornography is sex from the male "point of view." And sex from
the male point of view is violence. Making a broad claim based on
empirical studies finding sexual arousal in men exposed to violent
pornography, she argues:
Male sexuality is apparently activated by violence against
women.... One question that is raised is whether some
form of hierarchy is currently necessary for male sexuality
to experience itself. If so, and gender is understood to be a
hierarchy, perhaps the sexes are unequal so that men can
be sexually aroused . . . or, part of the male interest in
keeping women down lies in the fact that it gets men up.
(Ibid.)
Thus, battery of women, hatred of women, misogyny, are "a dy-
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namic of sexual excitement itself" (p. 147; see also p. 179). While
violence and sadism certainly are impulses that have been manifested sexually, they are not the only impulses, a fact that MacKinnon notes only to cast it aside: "Not that sexuality in life or
media never expresses love and affection; only that love and affection are not what is sexualized in this society's actual sexual paradigm as pornography test ifes to it" (p. 139; emphasis supplied).
The confinement to "this society" is a needed one; pornography
does little to explain the patriarchy in cultures unfamiliar with
Western European and American pornographic materials. 9
To end male sexual dominance, women must use the law and
the state as a means to end sexual domination and subordination
by men. Women must seize power over law; feminist politics is to
be dedicated to eliminating the practices of legal subordination of
women identified through consciousness raising. Law can then be
used to ferret out and destroy domination and subordination: The
Dworkin-MacKinnon antipornography ordinance serves as such an
example of feminist efforts to end the violent domination of women. Andrea Dworkin and MacKinnon drafted and campaigned for
enactment of a law that defined some pornography as sex discrimination and gave women injured by pornography a right to sue for
injunctions and damages. The city of Indianapolis enacted one antipornography ordinance drafted by Dworkin and MacKinnon; the
courts found the ordinance violated the First Amendment (American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut 1985). MacKinnon attributes the
legal defeat of the ordinance to liberalism's failure to embody an
antisubordination notion, First Amendment assumptions "that do
not apply to the situation of women" (p. 204), and the hegemony of
the male point of view. If pornography were seen for what it is-an issue of sex equality consistent with an antisubordination principle and feminist jurisprudence-the ordinance could and would
be law (p. 246-47).
MacKinnon's reliance on sexual abuse of women, its prevalence, and its protection under legal standards to ground her theory is complete. Her focus on, and development of, her theory is
attractive both for its stunning simplicity and for its explanatory
power, but the absolute nature of a particular vision of sex produces internal and external difficulties. The internal difficulty is
readily identifiable in her selective application of consciousness
raising. Indeed, it is ironic that MacKinnon considers women's
voices in consciousness raising to be trustworthy until it comes to
positive descriptions of sexual experiences. While stressing the va9 I do not know if violent pornography exists across cultures; MacKinnon's claim appears to be ahistorical as well. Pornographic pictures and writings have existed for some time in human culture, but I am ignorant of their
extent, use, and nature, although I have seen erotic etchings by Rembrandt
and scanned Memoirs of A Woman of Pleasure (Fanny Hill) over twenty
years ago.
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lidity of the voices describing sexual abuse and its effects, she essentially denies that women's voices can be trusted in the area of
sexual pleasure. A number of insightful critics, including Patricia
Cain (1990), Barbara Flagg (1990), and Robin West (1987) have
pointed to this vulnerability of MacKinnon's theory by observing
that she has ignored women's felt experiences of pleasure in
heterosexual intercourse, in sexual domination or submission
(heterosexual or same sex), and in nondominating lesbian and
even hetero sex. MacKinnon's response to the criticism that she is
selectively inattentive to women's voices of pleasurable experience
is to analyze and explain those experiences from a psychological
perspective. To avoid or to rebut this criticism without resorting to
dismissing these accounts as examples of "false consciousness," she
relies on studies of the effects of abuse on, and anecdotes from,
survivors and then ties them to her broader claim. Because most
women have been sexually abused, MacKinnon asserts, they suffer
from posttraumatic stress disorders, repetition compulsions, denial,
and repression (pp. 146-54). Women may also go along with
heterosexual relations because of fear, which they repress or convert into more pleasant emotions. In response to women who insist
that they have exercised some choice in their sexual lives, she
states that saying "I chose it" is "a strategy for sanity" (p. 150), not
evidence of a subject who exists and chooses or evidence of
women's felt pleasures.
While I think psychological defenses do play a part in an individual's perception of "reality," I disagree that these defenses are a
dispositive argument against MacKinnon's critics. I agree that all
these things can be effects of sexual abuse and use. The devastating consequences of sexual abuse are real and can negatively affect
sexual attitudes and experiences, but the picture is not as simple
as MacKinnon portrays it to be. Reports from some survivors of
abuse, for example, indicate that "sex" in a trusting and loving relationship has been a pleasurable and fulfilling aspect of their
lives; they experience sex as wanted, chosen, and not compulsory,
not because they are trying to preserve their sanity, but because
for them it is "true."
Further, while the effects of sexual abuse are extremely important to understanding the situation of women, I don't think
they should be used to discredit what women say if one is claiming
that what women say is the basis of one's theory. While "false consciousness" is a political condition that is a given, and denial, repression, and conversion reactions are arguably remediable psychological conditions, they are actually political and psychological
explanations for the same phenomenon and thus both discredit
women's voices about sexuality. Moreover, because defense mechanisms and stress disorders can and do affect everything we experience and perceive, the potential exists for discrediting women's
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voices in any area of experience, a result that MacKinnon surely
does not advocate or want.
Ultimately, several of MacKinnon's other theoretical arguments, powerful as they are, remain only partially persuasive.
First, her portrayal of male sexuality appears to be too unidimensional. Second, if men choose to dominate women, how can sex/
gender be simply "social constructs"-where does the power to
choose come from? Third, if women are only victims of male sexual violence-and I do not dispute her assertion that many women
in the United States have been or will be or are-are we defined
solely by our victimhood? If so, where are those who can act
against male power? MacKinnon never really answers these questions; indeed, she abandons her psychological explanations for a
political solution: she quotes Marx on the development of the proletariat's consciousness, implying by analogy that women as a
group will come to the same group awareness (p. 104). Thus,
MacKinnon appears to use "group consciousness" as a stand-in for
the awakening of individual consciousness. But if women are the
group from whom sex is taken and the group that is objectified,
reliance on a form of "socialized women's knowing" through consciousness raising maintains an objectivist and social constructivist
stance toward women (pp. 101-2). Finally, while MacKinnon's critique of law as it exists is quite good, she does not really develop
her argument for her reliance on radical legal change as the solution to women's oppression.
III. ZILLAH EISENSTEIN: THE PROBLEM OF EQUALITY
In contrast to MacKinnon's arguments are those of Zillah
Eisenstein's The Female Body and the Law. While MacKinnon emphasizes domination and equality based on an antisubordination
approach, Eisenstein, a liberal feminist, emphasizes sameness and
a kind of "formal" legal equality corrected for the misperception
that the model of the individual is male. As does MacKinnon,
Eisenstein emphasizes the dangers of the "differences" approach
to gender inequality but draws a different conclusion from that
danger. Unlike MacKinnon, who emphasizes dominance, Eisenstein emphasizes sameness. After a promising beginning, in which
she argues against dichotomies and either/or thinking, she concludes that almost any acknowledgment of "difference" is dangerous for women and thereby maintains the either/or logic she has
sought to refute. Because difference is likely to be used politically
by the Right to reaffirm gender roles and women's subordination
to men, it is a better political strategy for women to insist on their
sameness to men. "The sameness model, given law's phallocratic
standard, is radical, even if insufficiently so" (p. 107); feminists
should reassert that women are "more like males than unlike
them" (ibid.). Sameness is not only politically the best strategy,
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however; Eisenstein's book suggests that sameness is the theoretically proper ground as well. As a liberal feminist, she is concerned
with making it possible for women to enjoy the same freedoms and
choices as men in a liberal society.
As sexuality is to patriarchy for MacKinnon, pregnancy is to
patriarchal law for Eisenstein. Rather than being sexually objectified, women's bodies are "engendered" as pregnant and as
"mother." Women's bodies are never recognized as the physical
embodiment of diverse, individual human beings; women become
gendered constructs. The solution to this difficulty lies in liberalism. Women, argues Eisenstein, are the same as men; feminists
should return to the liberal feminist emphasis on sameness to
challenge the conservative resurgence of emphasis on difference.
She argues that "difference" is always used to disadvantage women; because the referent for sameness is male, the sameness/difference debate is a trap for feminists. "If one looks for difference,
that is what one finds"; women will suffer in the comparison (p.
18). It would seem, then, that if we concentrate on looking for
sameness, that is what we will find, with the exception of biological reproductive roles. It is true that males and females share
many of the same characteristics, but Eisenstein's insistence on
sameness, without more, ultimately ends up reaffirming the very
model of the human as male she rightly criticizes.
The project of liberalism, according to Eisenstein, is to promote women's equality through law, freeing them "from their engendered difference" (p. 221). Eisenstein's liberalism, properly understood, is a kind of "radical pluralism" in which equality under
law should follow Ronald Dworkin's formula of equal treatment
and equal concern and respect for individuals (pp. 22, 218-19). Sex
discrimination, properly understood, would be "redefined to mean
the treatment of an individual woman as a member of a sex class
that restricts her freedom of choice and self determination" (pp.
221-22). Thus, she appears to subscribe to the liberal notion of
human beings as rational, separate agents, rejecting the argument
of some feminists that women's bodies and reproductive role distinguish their nature from that of men. In response to feminists
who posit that women's bodies are different in significant ways
from men's-we menstruate, we lactate, we contain and nurture
(or not) potential life-Eisenstein cautions against "essentializing."
As soon as we focus on these attributes or physicalities, we will be
engendered rather than individuated, and she reminds us that essentializing women's bodies is what "anti-feminists have always
done" (p. 93). Eisenstein does recognize that the "difference" of
pregnancy is the biggest dilemma for liberal feminists who wish to
argue that women are just like men in any way that matters and
seeks, accordingly, to resolve the problem it presents. Her book is
an excellent, if ultimately only partial, attempt to solve the problem from a legal liberal political perspective.
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Law, according to Eisenstein, together with the common liberal formula that likes should be treated alike, has not adequately
dealt with pregnancy or motherhood. Eisenstein correctly argues
that applying legal liberalism's principles of individualism and formal equality to women as well as men has foundered on "sameness" and "difference" because of one unavoidable difference:
women can (re)produce life and men cannot. Pregnancy, if nothing
else, creates a difference between males and females that cannot
be denied or made to go away (yet). This fact means that women
are unlike men, and thus far women, rather than men, have been
legally disadvantaged by the comparison. Eisenstein attributes this
to the "phallocratic interpretations" of law (p. 21). She seeks to
distinguish what she terms "phallocratic discourse," which is
meant to capture the "realm of language, signs and symbols" of
law, from patriarchy, which describes the concrete and actual social embodiments of male privilege (p. 21). Phallocratic discourse
makes the penis "the symbolic guarantor of significance, which
privileges the male body" (ibid.), which in turn makes law unable
"to move beyond the male referent as the standard for sex equality" (p. 42). Thus, law "constructs and mirrors patriarchal social
relations through its phallocratic interpretations" (ibid.).
The use of the male referent is both a political and perceptual
category error that denies women's full humanity and equal legal,
political, and economic status with men. Law, even "[lliberal democratic law," originated in phallocratic interpretations, and is created, interpreted, and acted upon by men who maintain the privilege of "the phallus" (p. 31). Bodies are "discourses," as are "sex"
and "gender." In the "discourse" of the body, law and men see and
treat women's bodies as pregnant. In phallocratic discourse pregnant bodies signify "mother," not individuated human beings. All
female bodies are seen as at least potentially pregnant, and because pregnant bodies are "engendered," that is, interpreted to be
mother's bodies, we have the equation woman = pregnant = mother.
Because women can be pregnant, they constitute a "sex class" that
homogenizes them across class, race, and ethnicity in phallocratic
eyes; their differences are submerged (pp. 222-23).
Precisely how women's bodies equal pregnant bodies equal
mother came about is unclear. Eisenstein argues that while "until
well into the nineteenth century, woman was viewed as a 'vessel of
lust,'" she was transformed at some point into "wife-and-mother,"
an interpretation that remains imposed on her today (p. 83). "Femininity" for Eisenstein is now one and the same with biological
motherhood (p. 91). not sexuality, as MacKinnon has argued. What
the signifier "mother" means is never entirely clear either. It
seems to signify that the "proper and natural destiny" for females
is to be in the home, out of the public sphere, taking care of husband and children. That is, gender female apparently signifies destined for motherhood and service to children and men. Mother is
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emotional, nurturant, obedient to father, nonautonomous, and less
than fully human (pp. 108-9). She is the neoconservative/New
Right mother-image, the moral Right's Madonna to the liberal
feminist's Whore.
Eisenstein is correct in arguing that law in the United States
has been incoherent when dealing with pregnancy; recall for a moment the famous distinction between pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. Because no male analog to the pregnant body
exists, equality under liberal law as presently constituted becomes
an impossibility. As an illustration, Eisenstein notes the difficulties
that law and legal feminists have had with pregnancy in the Cal
Fed case (California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra
1987). Briefly, the case involved a sex discrimination challenge to a
California law requiring employers to give female employees up to
four months of unpaid maternity disability leave for medical reasons with a right to reinstatement. Cal Fed split the feminist legal
community into a number of camps. As Eisenstein relates, liberal
feminists, including the ACLU and NOW lawyers, fearing "protectionist" legislation and its history of disadvantaging women, opposed the law, because it treated women differently from men (pp.
101-4). The law had to be gender neutral: either men got disability
leave in analogous circumstances, or women should get no "special" treatment (Littleton 1987:1298). Another group of feminists
argued that equal employment opportunity and the episodic,
rather than permanent, nature of pregnancy meant that there was
special treatment only for a short time; that treatment did not unduly advantage women and should be allowed (Eisenstein, p. 106;
Littleton 1987:1298; Kay 1988:569-70). Eisenstein fails to note a
third argument made by Christine Littleton and supported by
other feminist lawyers. For this group, pregnancy was not "the
same as any other disability" as the ACLU argued, nor was it a
matter of equal employment opportunity. Those levels of comparison for equality analysis were inappropriate. Rather, the appropriate comparison is whether women have an "equal right" with men
to keep their jobs when they have children (Littleton 1987:1299).
Ultimately, the Court's opinions reflected the confusion pregnancy
creates for dominant legal thought. Six Justices, two writing separately, upheld the California statute on the grounds that it was not
preempted by, or inconsistent with, the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act; four Justices concluded the statute promoted equal employment opportunity and allowed women, like men, to have children
without losing their jobs; three Justices argued in dissent that the
legislation was "preferential" treatment for pregnancy.
Given this continued legal uncertainty, Eisenstein suggests
several strategies for feminists. First, they should concentrate on
women's sameness to men. Second, "sex" should be "distinguished" from "gender" and "pregnancy" (a biological condition)
from motherhood (an engendered condition). Third, women
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should rely on law reform to restructure the political economy of
sex and parenting. Eisenstein very much sees the law as influencing behavior,- and seems to assume that legislative and judicial
change will improve women's status in the United States. Laws
that treat pregnancy as a "fact," neither as "special" nor as "different," are our best hope, she claims, until we determine what the
ungendered meaning of pregnancy should be. Yet, she acknowledges, sex equality must encompass differences when necessary to
prevent "restriction" of women's choices. Making accommodation
for "the pregnant body" as needed in the workplace is one such
move, but more legislation is required: "We must construct a postpregnancy policy as well: parental leave, infant care, child day
care, child sick-care leave, and so on" (p. 209). Citing legislation in
Western European democracies, for example, she urges the enactment of legislation requiring maternity leave with reinstatement,
partial wages, and sc forth in the United States (pp. 214-15). Beyond pregnancy, she asserts, "we must endorse a sex/gender neutral stance" for parenting and caretaking (p. 215).
Eisenstein's observation that the female body is transformed
by patriarchy into a mother's body-the vessel for new life--can
be useful in understanding some issues such as "fetal protection
policies" in the workplace. Under these policies, all women who
cannot prove they are sterile could be excluded from jobs that pose
risks of exposure to toxic substances that would affect fetuses if
the women were to become pregnant. These policies certainly can
be tied to the equation woman= pregnant= mother. But there are
other interpretations as Well, which Eisenstein recognizes, such as
keeping women out of competition for well-paying jobs traditionally held by men. Further, Eisenstein's assumption that the relation of pregnancy to child care can be neatly severed in the context of a cultural, historic, economic, and perhaps even
phenomenological link of pregnancy to child care appears facile. 10
A more central criticism is Eisenstein's peculiar failure to take
seriously MacKinnon's claim that female bodies signal heterosexuality and therefore that the sex/gender distinction is false. That is,
the female body, or parts of the female body, as sexual signifier, is
absent from Eisenstein's theory. The failure to recognize the sexualization of women's bodies leads her to overlook a whole realm of
meaning and source of women's inequality. First, sometimes pregnant bodies signify "sexuality" and not motherhood. Pregnancy itself can be pornographic: A scholar doing research on pornography
once mentioned to me that he had found some piece of pornography with the (horrid) title "Pregnant Lesbians in Love." Second,
pregnancy signals sexuality, and that in itself has been the subject
of laws disadvantaging women. The pregnant woman has obviously
10 Cf. Wildman 1990 (criticizing MacKinnon for ignoring motherhood and
women's relation to children).
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been "doing It" with somebody. In Cleveland Board of Education
v. LaFleur (1974), the school board promulgated a rule requiring
pregnant schoolteachers to leave their jobs in their fifth month of
pregnancy. The reason for the rule, according to Justice Powell's
concurring opinion, was "to keep visibly pregnant teachers out of
the sight of schoolchildren" (ibid., p. 653),11 perhaps because pregnancy signaled sexuality, and teachers were supposed to be asexual. (Presumably, Cleveland schoolchildren had no siblings or
pregnant mothers.)
Eisenstein ignores the interpretation and construction of bodies as sexual in other ways as well. Her formula asserts that phallocratic discourse "pits the penis against the pregnant body" (p.
21), not against the female body, as in rape, or even the penis
against the vagina, as in the mutilation 2 fear of the Oedipus complex. Thus her formula appears partial at best. Indeed, at one
point, she claims that "sexual identity" is independent of the engendered coding of mother (p. 90), ignoring the engendered coding
of women as sex objects in pornography. Rather, pornography is a
form of liberation from the Right's insistence on maintaining
women's status as mothers (p. 165), rather than a discourse of
women's bodies as objects. In her discussion of the pornography
debate, sex and bodies as constructs and discourses change to unmediated and essential sexual pleasure. "MacKinnon reduces sex
to its engendered form" (p. 172), according to Eisenstein, suggesting that sex exists outside an engendered form. That "sex" exists apart from culture is at a minimum a claim that is undeveloped; the separation of sex from other aspects of human existence
seems to contradict Eisenstein's reliance throughout her book on
the socially constructed meaning of bodies.
Eisenstein argues that sex equality requires sexual freedom
for women and extols the gains of the sexual revolution (pp.
154-55). It is important for women to have access to contraception
and to be able to explore their own sexuality, but the "sexual
revolution" of the 1960s did not revolutionize attitudes to proper
sex roles. And her concern for equality, together with her fear of
"protectionist" legislation, leads her to make some extraordinary
statements about the pornography debate:
Whereas the claim of woman's "difference" from man is
usually used to deny women's right to equality, in this instance the discourse about "difference" is employed to enhance the supposed rights of women ....
The problem is
that the rights being enhanced are rights to protection
against violence and aggression rather than rights to equal
treatment. (P. 165)
I cannot see what is wrong about asserting rights against viol'

Powell, J., concurring. See ibid. at 641 n. 9 (majority opinion).
12 1 use the word "mutilation" instead of "castration," because Freud was
talking about the absorption/cutting off of the penis, not the scrotum.
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lence and aggression and why those "rights" aren't the same as a
claim for equality of treatment or, at a minimum, equal concern
and respect for women. There are reasons to oppose the pornography ordinance after conscientious consideration, but this does not
strike me as one of them. Apparently Eisenstein is firmly committed to a model of primarily "formal" equality, not one based on
substantive equality, antisubordination, or anything like it. And
this seems to be the case: Antipornography ordinances are "protectionist," emphasizing women's "difference," an emphasis that
Eisenstein has opposed throughout the book. Further, because of
her reliance on pregnancy as the characteristic distortion of phallocentric discourse, she sees pornography as a good: It "can help to
create a multiplicity of sexual imagery that enhances women's
equality by differentiating the female body from the mother's
body" (p. 173).
Finally, I am puzzled that Eisenstein, having carefully set out
an argument against privileging one model of the human over another, and privileging one discourse over another, is at such pains
to argue that pregnancy ought not to make any difference between
males and females, that women are just like men, or close to it,
even when they are pregnant. Her argument is ultimately one in
which men still define the standard for the human, with some accommodation to the inconvenient fact of pregnancy. Patriarchy
still defines the workplace, the economy, the aspirations of "the
human." In Littleton's (1987:1295) words, this book at best argues
for a symmetrical model of sexual equality which "agrees that differential treatment of biological differences (such as pregnancy,
and perhaps breast feeding) is necessary, but argues that cultural
or hard-to-classify differences (such as career interests and skills)
should be treated under an equal treatment or androgynous
model."
Inequality resulting from subordination and devaluation of
women's differences created by culture cannot be eradicated easily
through "equal treatment," because the foundation for that equal
treatment is inequality. Nor will simple treatment of women's difference with "equal concern and respect" do it; the basis of individualist notions masks the power relations that define women's lives.
Equal concern and respect could apply to separate spheres as easily as otherwise. The liberal feminist might want further to explore Littleton's "equal acceptance of our differences" notion, in
which difference located in the female does not immediately become disadvantage. Ultimately, this may be where Eisenstein
wants to go, too. At the end of her book, she speaks of a "radical
revision of sexual equality" and a "radical pluralism" which seems
very close to equal acceptance of and refusal to disadvantage "difference."
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IV. CAROL SMART: THE PROBLEM OF PRIVILEGE AND
DISABILITY
Carol Smart's book Feminism and the Power of Law resembles MacKinnon's work and evidences her influence in a number
of ways. Smart rejects liberal legalism, emphasizes the gendered
nature of law and legal discourse, focuses on issues of masculine
power, and emphasizes the importance of a feminist critique of law
based on women's experience. But if Eisenstein gives too much
credit to the ideal of the rule of law in changing women's status,
Smart is too negative about law's utility to feminists. Her text is a
radical sociologist's critique of feminist efforts to change law. Consistent with radical Marxist sociology, she absolutely rejects law
reform as a means for feminists to improve the status of women.
Arguing throughout the book that law reform is like trying to tear
down the master's house with the master's tools (Lorde 1983:98),
she concludes that feminists should resist the "siren call" (p. 160)
of law reform because reform is inadvisable, costly, and dangerous
for women. Law is power, but feminists must always stand outside
and apart from it. While Smart rightly declines to treat law as a
monolith, she does emphasize that law is a closed discourse; "in accepting law's terms in order to challenge law, feminism always
concedes too much" (p. 5). Feminists should dedicate their energies to continuing criticism of law from the outside.
The book itself is somewhat a grab bag of observations and
commentary on law, society, and legal subjects of concern to feminists. The book is loosely held together by the thesis that law is a
site of patriarchal power unresponsive to women's claims and concerns, and that law's patriarchy, together with the politics of the
moral Right, always co-opts and subverts feminist efforts (see, e.g.,
p. 46). The chapters provide snapshots of history, statutes, court
cases, testimony, interpretation, feminist voices and voices from
the right, and criticisms. This somewhat "postmodern" form of the
book can exasperate readers unfamiliar with the style, but the
book nevertheless contains some very worthwhile points. The
chapters range from an examination of the applicability of Foucault's thought to the analysis of law in society to the topics of
rape law, the law governing child sexual abuse, feminist jurisprudence, law's control of sex and (re)production, the pornography
debate, and a critique of rights. Concentrating on law in the
United Kingdom, Smart also draws on feminist legal studies and
work in the United States, Canada, and Western Europe. Although
it is sometimes unclear which jurisdiction she is referring to in her
criticisms, and one can argue that generalizations from one culture's experiences cannot be applied to reach conclusions about another's, the inclusion of a broad range of materials is helpful to a
reader unfamiliar with legal feminism beyond her borders.
In the first chapter, "The Power of Law," Smart applies a
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Foucauldian social analysis to law as an institution/discipline. According to Smart, law is a discipline that makes its own claim to
truth, or power/knowledge. "[L]aw, like science, makes a claim to
truth... that... is indivisible from the exercise of power" (p. 11).
Law not only has power in terms of its judgments "but also in its
ability to disqualify other knowledge and experience" (ibid.) Law
defines the real through the process of disqualification; the disqualification of women's experiences and voices by law and legal
method is an exercise of the patriarchal, or what Smart terms the
"phallocentric" (p. 27), "power of law" (pp. 32-33).
Smart takes issue with Foucault's analysis of law in three
ways. First, Foucault (1979) had seen law as an institution of the
past, medicine as the discipline of the present, and power as radically dispersed and a positive force. She disputes Foucault's characterization of law as a "withering" discipline, acknowledging that
Foucault did not spend much time analyzing law. Foucault's belief
that law was a thing of the past is contradicted by law's expansion
of power over every aspect of everyday life; law is hardly a "discipline" diminishing in importance (p. 8). Second, in an insightful
modification of Foucault's emphasis on the rise of the so-called disciplining professions of medicine and psychology/psychoanalysis,
Smart observes how law, spongelike, often absorbs and takes to itself the influences of these disciplines (pp. 96-97). Examples of this
appropriation of what Smart annoyingly terms the "'psy' discourses" and medicine run throughout the law as it applies to
women, from the merger of class, gender, medicine, and economics
into legal control of prostitutes in Britain in the nineteenth century (p. 94) to determinations of eligibility for infertility services in
the present (pp. 110-12). Finally, Smart correctly observes that
Foucault's celebration of the positive aspects of power and its radical dispersion is problematic for women living under the power of
patriarchy.
In the following chapters, Smart focuses on particular issues
for feminists concerned with law and seeks to demonstrate that
law's patriarchy is impervious to women's concerns and voices. She
argues throughout that feminist efforts to change law are and will
be co-opted either by legal phallocentrism or right wing antifeminism. Her chapter on rape, for example, supports MacKinnon's argument that the law of rape is determined by male definitions of
sex: "The whole rape trial is a process of disqualification (of
women) and celebration (of phallocentrism)" (p. 35). Citing MacKinnon, Smart argues that the rape trial is a form of pornographic
titillation (pp. 39-43). She agrees with MacKinnon that calling
rape violence avoids the problem of directly confronting male sexuality but dismisses her argument that rape is a crime of sex, not
violence, with the statement that there is "a continuum between
(hetero)sex and rape" without explaining what that continuum
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might be. Rape becomes a problem of "strategy" for which Smart
has no particular answer (p. 44).
Even if rape is a major concern of feminists and is an area
where law and legal definitions define the "real," rape reform efforts have not made much difference in that reality. Smart cites
the experience of Canadian feminists to demonstrate that attempts
to reform the law of rape can open the door to legislation repressing "good sex" as well, including homosexuality and "underage" sex (p. 46). 13 She asserts that in the United Kingdom, any
"pro-women demands can be co-opted into more reactionary law
and order demands which in turn enhance pro-family, anti-feminist rhetoric which is so powerful in the 1980's," thereby running
the risk of "turning into a traditional moral purity campaign"
(ibid.). Conceding that feminists cannot simply give up on rape
law, ultimately Smart gives no guidance beyond saying law is a discursive field and "must be challenged most fundamentally" (p. 49).
In a similar vein, her discussion of "surrogacy" and pornography illustrates the relation of patriarchal legal assumptions and
antifeminist morality and politics. In the United Kingdom, it is
now a crime for a mother not married to the father to surrender a
child to him at birth in return for compensation. The birth
mother, the birth father, and anyone who participates in such arrangements are guilty of a crime. Smart demonstrates that this
criminalization of childbearing contracts was based on a visceral
and patriarchal moral reaction, including beliefs about who "owns"
a woman's womb, proper motherhood, moral standards of human
conception, and women's (not men's) adultery (pp. 107-9). Similarly, according to Smart, legal regulation of pornography, which
can be seen either as an issue of morals or one of harm, has tended
to become an issue of morals. She argues that "the censorship
movement is reliant on anti-feminist feeling," that is, viewing
women as mothers and wives (p. 130). The pornography debate in
England has centered on the criminal law, creating the risk of cooptation of the pornography debate by the moral Right, evidenced
by the fact that "the regulation of what is defined as pornographic
goes hand-in-hand with measures like restricting sex education in
the schools ...and attempts to reduce the availability of abortion"
(p. 130). She cautions, "the tide of censorship is likely to be used
against all forms of feminism" (p 130).
Smart argues throughout her book that feminists must "resist
the temptation that law offers, namely, the promise of a solution"
(p. 165). She points to pornography as a clear example of the dangers of that temptation. First, she argues quite correctly, pornography is a complex subject; the "pornographic genre" extends far be13 Smart never explains why "under-age" sex is "good" or why repressing
it is "bad"; I assume she is concerned about attempts to control female sexuality through statutory rape laws.

434

LAW'S PATRIARCHY

yond sexually explicit and violent films and materials. Second, she
argues that even harm-based approaches are faulty. She refers
back to the difficulty of establishing lack of consent or coercion in
rape trials to refute any confidence that harm resulting from pornography could be proven (p. 131). Third, she notes that criminalizing pornography may increase exploitation because "[iut might
make matters worse for women who work in the skin trade because the conditions of production of pornography might worsen,
or the whole enterprise might move to the Third World where
safeguards on women's labor are far less extensive" (p. 133).
The MacKinnon-Dworkin ordinance that makes pornography
an issue of sex discrimination is more appealing to Smart. But
again, resorting to law is problematic. The problem of losing control over the direction of the law
is inherent in using civil law because those who have the
power to exercise it may not be feminist in orientation, but
women who represent organizations which are part of the
anti-feminist moral right. The practical definition of harm
would then come from a combination of moral right claims
and judicial attitudes rather than feminist principles. (P.
136)
Smart also asserts that regulating pornography would create the
"risk of using a law which could be used against feminism and
other forms of political speech"-a classic legal liberal argument.
To bolster her opposition to using law to combat pornography, she
also argues that the issue is too divisive for feminists, that sex discrimination law has accomplished little, and that lack of agreement "about the harm of pornography" means that feminists
should not use law to regulate pornography. She concludes:
Pornography is an issue which clearly reveals the limits of
law in terms of feminist strategy. It reveals that there are
major problems in transforming any feminist analysis of
women's oppression into a legal practice, as if law were
merely an instrument to be utilized by feminist lawyers
with the legal skills to draw up the statutes. (Pp. 136-37)
Efforts to create a feminist jurisprudence are also doomed: it
is a "false quest," a "trap . .. whereby feminists find they enter
into a game whose rules are predetermined by masculine requirements and positivistic tradition" (pp. 67-68). The works of Gilligan
and MacKinnon replicate this error. Feminist jurisprudence fails
because "it does not de-center law." Instead
it preserves law's place in the hierarchy of discourses
which maintains that law has access to truth and justice. It
encourages a "turning to law" for solutions, it fetishizes
law rather than deconstructing it. The search for a feminist jurisprudence is generated by a feminist challenge to
the power of law as it is presently constituted, but it ends
with a positivistic, scientific feminism which seeks to replace one hierarchy of truth with another. (Pp. 88-89)
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As a legal feminist scholar, I may be suspect when I say that
Smart's absolute rejection of law as a site for feminist efforts is
gravely mistaken and separatist. Yet women cannot simply refuse
to participate in law and legal discourse: Laws and courts determine child custody, support, access to birth control, and the consequences of marriage, to cite some examples. While I agree with her
that changing the law-on-the-books is not the end point, and I also
agree that we must maintain a continuing critique of patriarchy's
manifestations in law, I dispute her conclusion that the tenacity of
patriarchy in law is a reason to abandon efforts to use law to improve the situation of women. We should not be forced into the
either/or of reform or revolution. An effort that spans only about
twenty years should not be abandoned simply because instant
change has not been forthcoming. That feminist achievements in
law have been turned against women or have been disappointments means there are no quick fixes, not that there should be no
efforts at all. We should abandon neither short-term humanitarian
efforts nor long-term goals of changing the law and society totally,
as Stanley Cohen (1988) has argued. Revolutions are usually a long
time coming;, this does not mean they cannot occur.
. Indeed, law reform can have an overall positive impact and
make a difference: Roe v. Wade (1973) has made a major difference in the lives of countless women in the United States.
Although in light of the abortion funding cases denying abortions
to poor women and given the power of the anti-abortion/pro-life
movement in the 1980s, one could argue that the backlash and
damage created by Roe damaged women more than it helped them,
evidence exists to doubt this criticism. Even though Roe was a decision that heavily relied on the discourse of medicine instead of notions of women's equality-illustrating the disciplinary absorption
that Smart discusses-it became an important symbol and fact to
many women. And as a result of Roe, the medical technology of
abortion improved measurably: Abortions today are safer for
women and easier to accomplish than they were in 1973, and women are better off because of it. That we have lost ground as a result of reliance on a court-focused strategy and a failure to develop
grass-roots support for women's right to choose does caution
against relaxing our guard once law reform has been accomplished; it does not negate the accomplishment that was Roe.
Smart speaks of deconstruction as a method for feminists to
confront patriarchal law; deconstruction, as in identifying privileged poles in legal thinking and inverting them, can be a very effective strategy using law's own terms. Thus, contrary to her antilaw stance, deconstruction is a method to be used in law. 14 Smart
14

For an example from a feminist perspective, see Dalton 1985:1095-1114

(discussing cohabitation cases and contract law; courts have several possible
moves they can use to enforce or deny agreements between unmarried partners).
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also criticizes feminist efforts to gain legal rights; that "rights" are
both manipulable and atomistic does not negate their importance
to those who have not had them.'5 Further, while I agree with
Smart that we have not yet created a feminist vision of "law," I
disagree that we aren't beginning to form one. MacKinnon, for example, refuses to allow "male" understanding to define her jurisprudence. And law, being neither immutable nor unchanging, may
ultimately embody a feminist vision.
V. WHERE WE MIGHT GO FROM HERE
The preceding discussion argues that each of these books
sheds light on law and the situation of women, although they differ on what the feminist response should be and, indeed, on the
theoretical foundation of feminism. Each author challenges law's
patriarchy and demonstrates how it operates to continue women's
subordination. Ending women's subordination is the goal of feminists, and while law may present a particularly difficult field of endeavor for women because of its patriarchal assumptions, it is such
an important institution in modern society that we must continue
our efforts to change its role in the subordination of women.
Rather than subscribe to any one author's explanation for women's oppression, I think that recognition of all the explanations is
more useful, as the complexity of patriarchy requires complex responses and theories. There are three areas suggested by these
books that I think are of particular importance for law and society
study and work: the ending of violence against women, exploring
the significance of women's (re)productive power, and building
and changing the human community in response to feminism's
continuing critique of and resistance to patriarchy.
Of the three authors, MacKinnon is primarily concerned with
violence and its effects on women. And violence against women
seems to be an obvious and appropriate area for legal inquiry and
action. One does not have to agree with all MacKinnon's claims or
interpretations of the empirical literature on rape, pornography,
and so forth to appreciate that the sexual violence men do to
women and girls is widespread and horribly damaging to the
human personality. Empirically, experientially, quantitatively, and
qualitatively, rape and sexualized violence adversely and directly
affect millions of women in this culture and indirectly affect millions of others through fear. Rape and sexual abuse happen to lesbians and heterosexuals, girls and old women. MacKinnon ob15 Smart sees some utility in retaining rights language for the abortion
debate but advocates the abandonment of rights-based strategies generally (pp.
158-59). She also acknowledges that early feminist efforts to obtain legal
rights were important for women in their struggle against male privilege. But
she advocates abandonment of rights talk and the formulation of demands on
women's terms. For a discussion of the usefulness of rights as progressive
tools, see Williams (1987).
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serves: "Given that this [violence] is the situation of all women,
that one never knows for sure that one is not the next on the list
of victims until the moment one dies (and then, who knows) it
does not seems exaggerated to say that women are sexual, meaning that women exist, in a context of terror" (p. 150). But sexual
abuse is not the only form violence against women takes.
Although MacKinnon argues that "sexuality is violent, so perhaps [violence] is sexual" and that battery treats women as objects
and, therefore, in some sense is sexual (p. 179), it seems highly unlikely that misogyny is entirely reducible to sexuality and that its
manifestation in beating women is a sexual act. Violence and sex
are interrelated and separate; violent sex may be the normal practice in this culture, or it may not be, it may be the norm in other
cultures or not, but diminishing, hating, mistreating, hitting, and
killing girls and women seems to exist across cultures. In one report by a human rights observer, for example, abuse of females is
staggeringly widespread:
in Bangkok, Thailand, a reported 50 per cent of married
women are beaten regularly by their husbands. In the barrios of Quito, Ecuador, 80 per cent of women have been
physically abused . . . . [T]here are the less recognized
forms of violence. In Nepal, female babies die from neglect
because parents value sons over daughters ....

In India,

young brides are murdered by their husbands when parents fail to provide enough dowry ....

Studies confirm that

where the preference for sons is strong, girls receive inferior medical care and education, and less food. (Heise
1989)16

Power and control over another human being may have its origins elsewhere than in sexual "desire," including male sexual desire. MacKinnon, in arguing that rape is sex, not violence separate
from sex, pithily observes, "If it is violence, why didn't he just hit
her?" (p. 134). But if battery is sex, why didn't he just rape her?
Violence may come from displaced rage, it may come from a feeling of powerlessness in the world, it may come from fear, it may
come from desire to control another person, or a number of other
sources. I would also argue that the mistreatment of female
human beings cross-culturally cannot be based entirely on male
sexuality as defined by Western pornography, although it may be
based on the desire of men to maintain power and control over another human being. Men batter and beat women and girls, men
starve and control women and girls, without "getting off." And
women hate and abuse themselves and their girl children, which
doesn't seem "sexual" to me, although the consequences and effects are equally devastating.
16 See also Mydans 1988 ("In traditional Bangladesh, women are in effect
the property of their fathers or husbands. They receive less education, less
food, and poorer health care than their brothers").
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Violence against women and girls, whether legally permitted
(the marital rape exemption, the (old) British rule of thumb) or
legally ignored (the nonprosecution of husbands in "bride-burning" cases in India, failure to prosecute those who rape African
American women, and failure to protect battered wives), is terrorism. Treating men in this manner is considered criminal and punishable; terrorism against women and girls should be seen as
equally criminal. As skeptical as social science may be of law's
ability to change behaviors or stop criminality, it would be morally
irresponsible to stop trying to make law listen and respond to female human beings. If it is dangerous to resort to the criminal law,
because the moral Right will co-opt feminist efforts or because the
patriarchal assumptions of law will be turned against us, we still
must use law. If the law doesn't hear women's voices, because it
hears only (white) male language and patriarchal terms, then feminists of all colors must inundate the law with the language of
women, their lives, their experiences. If we have to create new
law, neologisms, new doctrines, and new solutions and sanctions,
then we must do it. As long as law approves of, trivializes, or ignores men's violence toward women, it enables the violence to continue.
The second thing that seems of utmost importance is that feminists must come to terms with what the life-giving capacity of
women means and should mean. Feminists have often tried to
avoid the material and personal implications of pregnancy and
childbirth for women, perhaps wishing it would all go away. But
only women get pregnant, and most women in the world are pregnant at some point in their lives. It therefore makes utterly no
sense to hurl the accusation of "essentialist" at feminists who are
trying to explore the issues that pregnancy, childbearing, and childrearing entail for women. Eisenstein is absolutely right to begin
consideration of the fact of pregnancy, even if I disagree with the
conclusions she draws. The capacity to create life is an enormous
power; it almost makes women god(esse)s.
Marilyn French has argued that women's life-giving capacity
had a role in the creation of patriarchy; patriarchy has been dedicated not only to controlling females as females but also to controlling the means of (re)production (see, e.g., French 1985:111).
From what my mother called the "begatitudes" in the Bible, to the
discovery that the human sperm contained a fully formed homunculus that was deposited in the "empty vessel" of the woman, to
prohibitions on birth control and abortion, men have tried to control human (re)production by denying women a part in it. Many
feminists have tended to replicate this denial by insisting that
pregnancy has no meaning separate from gendered stereotypes;
the move is a "natural" one when one considers that the fact of
pregnancy relegates women to subordinate status in the world. On
the other hand, failing to explore the existential and phenomeno-
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logical meaning of pregnancy and motherhood to women means
that we continue to adopt a male-focused definition of what it is to
be human.
Eisenstein wants to separate (re)production from engendered
motherhood; feminists have to think long and hard about the damage this could cause women as well as the potential in this severance. To enable women to participate in the public sphere of work,
Eisenstein argues for more day care for the children of women
workers. But because day-care workers are overwhelmingly poor
women and women of color, having women care for children simply perpetuates the assignment of childrearing to women and replicates the privileged divisions of women that have worked to the
detriment of all women. Further, day care does little to restructure a workplace based on a model of an independent male
worker. Perhaps to solve the problem of exclusively linking
women to child care, Eisenstein argues that parenting should be
"ungendered" as well. She advocates having men take on the responsibility of child care and parenting in order to free women to
work. Even were this to occur, the workplace would still be structured around the model of independent male workers unless
Eisenstein assumes that the workplace will respond quickly to
men's changed circumstances. Further, men have to be convinced
that this is a human activity worth doing, that it is not "unmanly"
to care for and nurture their children. And for many single
mothers, there is no man present to convince.
We also must be careful to acknowledge that for many women, identity may be closely tied to child care and nurturing, because that is where they experience recognition of their "specialness" and value. This is not a trivial point. It is difficult to combat
socialization and recognition for the role of caretaker and nurturer; these things are essential for children to have. If men and
fathers resist taking on these roles, women and mothers will almost inevitably fill the gap. Further, the values of caring, nurturing, and protecting ascribed to "mother" ought not to be abandoned or ignored, despite the perversion of those values and their
rigid assignment to women in service to women's oppression.
Rather, we should seek to expand and transform them in a way
that permits us all to have care and nurturance and to care and
nurture. We must also work to change the economic structure so
that those who have and care for children do not suffer economic
hardship as a result. Thus, the short-term and long-term goals of
feminism may have to differ; in the short term, many women are
going to be unwilling to sacrifice their children to the principle of
equality, but with restructuring and redefining of parenting and
the workplace, in the long term, the investment we all have in the
stereotypical identification of "mother" might diminish and the
strength of the values associated with "mother" increase.
Feminists also need to be aware of and concerned about, as
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Smart notes, the latest effort to control women's (re)productive capacity in the form of concern for "fetal rights." "Fetal rights" are
not confined to the anti-abortion campaign; they are also tied to a
campaign to deny women's recent assertions of power and self-sufficiency and to condemn women's moral failings. Because some
women deny risks or desperately need their jobs, because some
women are addicts and can't get treatment even when they want
it,17 fetal rights advocates have concluded that all women cannot
be trusted to avoid exposing unborn fetuses to toxic chemicals, illegal drugs, or alcohol, and therefore they must be controlled. The
use of "fetal protection policies" to exclude women from maledominated jobs in the United States, together with the condemnation of the moral turpitude of "drug mothers" and the use of the
criminal law to punish them (Teltsch 1990; Lewin 1990) implies,
again, a derogation of women's personhood. The tragedy of birthdefective infants is a concern, but so is the leap to generalizations
about women. Until the Supreme Court decided UAW v. Johnson
Controls in 1991, fetal protection policies have prevented poor and
working-class women from gaining economic power, or have allowed them to gain that power only at the cost of losing their
(re)productive power through sterilization.
The Court's recent decision that title VIII and the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act prohibit employers from excluding nonsterile
women from jobs in Johnson Controls (1991) places a legal brake
on the exclusion of women from the workplace in the interest of
potential fetuses, although it is too early to tell what the response
of employers will be. The majority opinion, in a victory for liberal
feminism, both struck down the particular policy involved and
strongly suggested that no fetal protection policies that single out
women for exclusion would be permissible under a narrow reading
of title VII's bona fide occupational qualification exception; if
women are just like men in their ability to perform a job's tasks,
they cannot be excluded from the job on the basis of "safety" or
"cost." Nor can protectionist policies justify denying a woman a
choice between her "reproductive role" and her "economic role,"
because, according to the Court, Congress left the "choice" to women (ibid., p. 4215). The decision has already been attacked by one
scholar for endangering potential fetuses and for not insisting on
protection for men as well as women from toxics (Rosen 1991) and
by a few editorials fretting about employer tort liability for birth
defects. Women quickly vanish from view in these criticisms; they
remain undifferentiated wombs. At least for the moment, however, efforts to control women's access to jobs in the United States
17 Teltsch 1990 ("most hospitals that treat addiction discourage low-income pregnant drug or alcohol abusers from seeking care .... In New York
City, a survey of 78 drug centers found that 87 per cent exclude pregnant users
of crack"); Lewin 1990 ("most alcohol and drug treatment programs exclude
pregnant women").
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via concern for nonexistent, unconceived fetuses have been
thwarted.
Feminists should never abandon a concern with law, but they
need to recognize, as Smart emphasizes, that law is often unresponsive to feminist concerns and that the law-in-action may
thwart their efforts. Therefore, continuing criticism is necessary.
Law hardly operates in a vacuum, and we must recognize that it
influences and is influenced by the human world that constitutes
it. In that world, "gender" is a fundamental concept around which
religion, morality, politics, law, science, medicine, society, culture,
and economics have revolved. Feminists must recognize the influence of all these belief systems, power sites, and discourses in constructing a world divided into "masculine" and "feminine," "male"
and "female," a world in which the female still does not count for
much, even to many feminists.
Accordingly, feminists who want to create revolutions with
law must be cautious. Change from the top down is occasionally
possible, of course, but resting on a perceived legal victory, as feminists in the United States did after Roe, can be terribly mistaken.
And even reformist legal change may be thwarted by other established power arrangements that perpetuate patriarchal structures.
For example, women bear primary caretaking responsibility for
children and adults as well as participate in wage labor. Eisenstein
(pp. 209-16) argues that legislation mandating paid parental and
child care leave employment policies, common in Europe, is necessary to ensuring equality for women in the United States. But the
politics of neoconservative economics, and the privileging of capitalist employers over employees, as well as patriarchal bias, led
President Bush in 1990 to veto a relatively toothless law requiring
larger employers to provide employees three months of unpaid
"family leave" with a right to reinstatement (Beck 1990:48, 50).
Thus, even a relatively modest legal reform failed because of a
complex of patriarchal power relations.
CONCLUSION
Women are not only victims, incompetent and incapable of
survival, development, courage, and strength. In fact, that women
have achieved so much, going unnoticed in daily acts of courage, is
impressive and inspiring. Women also have a capacity to victimize
and dominate others; estimates are that women account for about
half the adults who abuse children in nonsexual ways, and women
have enthusiastically supported domination and oppression of different classes and colors of people (hooks 1984). Not all men dominate, and it is especially difficult for men who do not dominate to
comprehend that they are advantaged in a world that seems to diminish them or oppress them. Other men do not see themselves as
having any power over women at all. Given all this, it is still prob-
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ably true that most of us do internalize and reproduce structures
and patterns of gendered relating, consciously or not; as Mary
Becker (1990) has noted in another context, our investment in heterosexuality alone means that we repress conflict and examination
of our attitudes and behaviors. Thus, criticism, examination and
revision, and revolution across all dimensions of human practice
are necessary. And development of alternatives to the way things
are is equally necessary: Criticism alone will not build a world in
which women and girls, men and boys, are able to exist free of
domination and dominance. Freud, hardly a favorite of feminists,
was right when he observed that "love and work" were necessary
to human well-being. Women and men, rather than splitting these
things, need to share them and practice them.
A final note on the tenacity of patriarchy requires that we recognize that the destabilization created by the feminist critique is
deeply threatening to everyone. I can conceive of no revolution
more total than that of women and girls throughout the world becoming full human beings, moving past status to contract and beyond. To "admit .. . no power or privilege . .. nor disability" will
not be easy; the structures of sex division are deep and endemic.
Bringing the two together will mean challenging our deepest beliefs, assumptions, training, practices, and experiences. It will
mean that all we think, feel, and were taught to believe is "up for
grabs." We must be willing to give up our advantages, habits, and
understandings of the world in the face of the terrible groundlessness that entails. Eventually, nothing short of this will do.
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